The India–Pakistan nuclear rivalry at sea by Khan, Feroz Hassan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2017-06-16
The IndiaPakistan nuclear rivalry at sea
Khan, Feroz Hassan
Khan, Feroz Hassan. "The IndiaPakistan nuclear rivalry at sea."
theasiadialogue.com, June 16, 2017.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66183
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
June 16, 2017
The India–Pakistan nuclear rivalry at sea
theasiadialogue.com/2017/06/16/india-pakistan-nuclear-rivalry-at-sea/
Written by Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan.
As 2017 dawned, Pakistan, avowing ‘completion of the nuclear triad’ and a ‘credible second
strike capability’, successfully test fired its first submarine-based nuclear-capable cruise
missile—Babur-III—with a declared range of 450 kilometers. India had already introduced
its nuclear-powered submarine Arihant, some four years back, which is capable of carrying
about 12 nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles—K-15, also referred as Sagarika (SSBN).  The
advent of a sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD) is a critical new dimension of deterrence
stability in a volatile region that is characterized by uncertainty, the threat of violent
extremist forces and conventional military doctrines of limited war under the nuclear
overhang.
The absence of robust command and control mechanisms on both sides, and a lack of clarity
in safeguards and doctrines generate uncertainty that could be detrimental to regional
stability.
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With both sides completing the nuclear triad and strengthening ‘assured second strike’
capabilities, one set of arguments hold that ‘assured second strike’ would stabilize
deterrence. Others challenge this notion, arguing that vulnerability and command, control
and communications (C3) challenges at sea create conditions for greater instability. 
Studies on the ramifications of maritime nuclear crises involving Indian and Pakistani
nuclear forces are few, if not absent, since nuclear weapons at sea are a recent development
in the South Asian security landscape. This essay focuses on the repercussions of South
Asian nuclear weapons at sea, on the larger Asian security balance and its impact on
maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).
Geopolitical alignments and strategic balancing
Even prior to the introduction of South Asian maritime nuclear forces, the vast IOR (over 2
million square miles) was beset with challenges such as terrorism and piracy that
warranted the operation of naval task forces CTF-150 and CTF-151 respectively, within
which the Pakistan Navy continues to play a significant role. Ensuring stability and
maintaining open sea lines of communication (for the passage of over one-third of the
world’s oil) is critical.  These imperatives notwithstanding, the strategic dynamics in
Southern Asia are compounded by shifting Sino-Indian rivalry in the maritime domain,
where India and China are competing for influence and resources in the IOR. Now with the
maturation of China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Road (MSR), a new
dimension in the China-Pakistan strategic relationship has emerged. The advancement in
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a vital land and maritime fulcrum for
BRI – while promising Pakistan a economic boom is also aggravating Indian concerns. Just
as in the Sino-Indian equation, the India-Pakistan antagonism is also shifting, from a
predominantly land-based conflict into the potential confrontation at sea.
India is deepening its strategic partnership with the United States to balance against China
and engaging in maritime advancement with the help of Western/ Russian allies. A cursory
analysis would suggest that even if India’s SSBN is providing India with an acute sense of
security and balance vis-à-vis China, the resultant strategic anxiety it causes in Pakistan
incentivizes China to bolster Pakistani naval capacity. Thus, it has exacerbated India’s
strategic dilemma. Pakistan is reportedly purchasing eight air-independent propulsion
(AIP) diesel attack submarines from China, which, alongside the development of
the Gwadar port, is indicative of deepening China-Pakistan maritime relations. India
acquired state-of-the-art Boeing P8-I (Long-range Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-
Submarine Warfare) aircraft that significantly increases India’s surveillance capability. A
simplified generalization would suggest that the United States and China are outsourcing
their system-level rivalry by bolstering their respective regional strategic allies. Though
neither United States nor China desire a crisis in South Asia, both seem to inadvertently
propel the India-Pakistan antagonism and arms race.
Doctrinal Dissonance
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The wars and crises in the past seventy years have not brought peace or crisis resolution to
South Asia. Pakistan’s structural disadvantage and conventional force asymmetry
compared to India is only likely to grow, as the latter invests heavily in nuclear and
conventional force modernization. India’s land doctrine, colloquially dubbed ‘Cold Start’,
envisages conducting a limited war involving land/air shallow manoeuvres into Pakistani
territory aimed at inflicting significant destruction of its armed forces. The Pakistani
answer was to introduce short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons for battlefield use, under
the concept of ‘full spectrum deterrence’.  In turn, India has officially warned of ‘massive
retaliation’ against any nuclear use on Indian forces anywhere. Pakistan is dismissive of
India’s nuclear retaliation and believes it has checkmated India’s conventional force plan.
That has recently led to reports of India rethinking its nuclear doctrine.
These doctrinal constructs imply that both countries are engaging in risk manipulation
strategies to test the will of the other, while continuing to build nuclear and conventional
forces.  Arguably, even if it is believed that battle on land is stalemated or stabilized, the
encounter has moved to sea where Pakistan’s disadvantage in naval assets is exploitable. 
The Pakistani response to introduce nuclear weapons into the mix of maritime forces
might complicate India’s naval coercion strategy but increases operational challenges once
weapons are at sea.
Evolving South Asia SBSD: Challenges and Implications
Given the crisis-prone nature of India-Pakistan relations, any land-based crisis can quickly
expand to the sea.  In major wars, typically India might attempt a naval blockade, as it did
in 1971. Deriving from the Falkland war (1982), India has embraced the concept of
declaring maritime exclusion zones (MEZ), for strategic coercion and with the purpose of
strangling Pakistan’s economic lifeline that depends on maritime trade. This implies
Pakistan’s navy would aggressively retaliate. Pakistan has publicly declared that economic
coercion would be one of the factors determining the nuclear-use threshold. The India-
Pakistan naval crisis and declaration of MEZ in the North Arabian Sea would also have a
significant negative impact on global commerce. Oil tankers exiting the Persian Gulf, for
example, would be likely to be diverted around the conflict zone or in a worst-case
scenario, subjected to inadvertent attack.
Operationalizing Naval Deterrence: Concepts, Survivability and Command
and Control
During the Cold War, SSBNs cemented mutually assured destruction, thereby creating
strategic stability between the Super Powers.  How congruous is the Cold War concept of
SBSD in India and Pakistan’s operational conditions?  The Indian and Pakistani strategic
thinking regarding sea-based nuclear weapons are still evolving, as objectives and
operational concepts are different. Neither country has publicly articulated which
operational concept they would adopt, though operating conditions in the IOR and Arabian
Sea are significantly different. Both navies also operate in relatively congested waters.
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Nuclear naval forces operate under two concepts: continuous at-sea patrol (to prevent
surprise attacks) and bastion strategy (to ensure enough warning time, to sortie the SLBMs
out of the bastion/port). Once ships are at sea, the foremost factor is to survive against
enemy actions. If detected and cornered, the nuclear-armed submarines would be under
pressure to use their arsenal before they are destroyed. Conversely, nuclear-armed boats
operating from protected bastions are dependent on other vessels and geography to protect
them. Their operational necessities are affected by factors such as target-set, ranges of
missiles, adversary’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability and command and control
complexities.
A universally accepted concept of command and control, in all states operating nuclear
forces, is the ‘always/ never principle.’ Nuclear weapons will always be used when
commanded and never when not commanded. This principle hinges on the reliability and
security of communication systems, which is the foremost challenge once submarines are
at sea. Related to this are questions of human and personnel reliability, the question of
pre-delegation and/or maintaining centralized control, and nature of control mechanism.
Deriving from geography, naval force posture and the pattern of wars, Indian and
Pakistani strategic choices can be speculated on. Indian SSBNs and strategic thinking
indicates force projection capabilities and targeting from a distance. India may likely prefer
continuous at-sea patrol options compounding maintenance and command and control
challenges. In contrast, Pakistan does not have SSBNs nor has indicated any power
projection ambitions; its resources are limited and the strategy is to balance against India.
Nuclear weapons on diesel boats limit their operational range and pose survivability
challenges under India’s ASW improvements (for example P8-Is). Pakistan is thus more
likely to lean towards the bastion concept. However, it also has options of a hybrid model
to choose between port/bastion and limited at-sea patrol strategies.  Heavy commercial
traffic in congested waters of the Northern Arabian Sea creates noisy conditions for diesel
submarines to operate and escape detection. In times of lesser traffic, nuclear weapons
could remain in bastion or in port, which would allow it to escape pressures to pre-delegate
and maintain the positive and centralized control of the Pakistani national command
authority (NCA).
In sum, India’s introduction of the SSBNs, simultaneous enhancements of its conventional
submarine force and anti-submarine warfare capabilities has exacerbated Pakistan’s threat
perception and evoked reciprocal nuclear responses. A South Asian naval crisis would not
severely damage the regional economies, but will have global ramifications. The merging of
nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, and conventional naval assets along with commercial
shipping increases the risk of accidental encounters or inadvertent engagements. The
absence of robust command and control mechanisms on both sides, and a lack of clarity in
safeguards and doctrines generate uncertainty that could be detrimental to regional
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stability. Unless India and Pakistan engage in bilateral naval restraint dialogue and discuss
maritime confidence-building measures, the region will continue to be in a tinderbox
situation.
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